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Business Associations
by Crystal J. Clark*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys notable cases in the areas of corporate, limited
liability company, partnership, agency, and joint venture law decided
between June 1, 2012 and May 31, 2013, by the Georgia Supreme Court,
the Georgia Court of Appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, and the United States district courts located in
Georgia.' This Article also discusses relevant legislation enacted during
the survey period.
II.

ISSUES OF FIRST IMPRESSION

A.

Heightened Standardof Care When Entities Are Held in T-ust
In Rollins v. Rollins,2 the Georgia Court of Appeals examined the
appropriate duty owed by directors of corporations held within trusts
when such directors are also trustees.' In Rollins, the settlor had
created several trusts for the benefit of his grandchildren and greatgrandchildren. Each trust held interests in a number of family entities,
including several corporations, a partnership, and an investment fund
(the Entities), created and included in the trusts for tax-planning
purposes. After the settlor's death, the trustees were alleged to have

* Associate in the firm of McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
Appalachian State University (B.A., summa cum laude, 2003); Mercer University, Walter
F. George School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2009). Member, Mercer Law Review
(2007-2009); Annual Survey of Georgia Law Editor (2008-2009). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia business associations law during the prior survey period,
see W. Carter Bates III & Kort D.L. Peterson, Business Associations, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, 64 MERCER L. REv. 61 (2012).
2. 321 Ga. App. 140, 741 S.E.2d 251(2013), cert. granted, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 753 (2013).
3. Id. at 140, 147, 741 S.E.2d at 252, 257.
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shifted assets from the trusts into the Entities, made distributions from
the Entities, and altered voting rights and control of the Entities in
violation of the trust agreements.' The Superior Court of Fulton County
held that "because the [trustees'] management decisions and distributions took place at the entity level, rather than at the trust level,"
reliance on the terms of the trust to establish a breach of fiduciary duty
was "misplaced."' The court of appeals disagreed.'
In evaluating the appropriate standard of care, the appellate court
looked to the "sparse" number of cases from Georgia, in addition to
persuasive cases from California and New York.' Ultimately, the court
determined that the trustees could be held to "trustee-level fiduciary
standards of care" for their actions related to the Entities, which they
controlled and held within the trusts at issue.' Thus, it is now clear
that a heightened standard of care applies to directors of entities held
in trusts when such directors are also trustees of those trusts.
B. Expanded Application of the Doctrine of Administrative Exhaustion
In Bobick v. Community & Southern Bank,' the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that the doctrine of administrative exhaustion applies to
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
(FIRREA).Vo In Bobick, a bank filed suit in the Superior Court of
Carroll County against a customer for defaulting on a loan. Prior to the
customer's filing of an answer, the bank failed and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (the FDIC) was appointed as the bank's receiver.
The customer filed her answer and asserted multiple counterclaims
against the bank and its chief executive officer."
It is settled law in Georgia that if the doctrine of administrative
exhaustion applies and a party fails to pursue the administrative
remedies available, the trial court is deprived of subject matter
jurisdiction over the party's action.12 In determining whether this
doctrine should apply with respect to FIRREA, the court looked to both
FIRREA's legislative history and the reasoning of the United States

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 141-42, 741 S.E.2d at 253-54.
Id. at 147, 741 S.E.2d at 256.
Id. at 147, 741 S.E.2d at 257.
Id. at 147-50, 741 S.E.2d at 257-58.
Id. at 149-50, 741 S.E.2d at 258.
321 Ga. App. 855, 743 S.E.2d 518 (2013).
12 U.S.C. § 1821 (2012); Bobick, 321 Ga. App. at 860, 743 S.E.2d at 525.
Bobick, 321 Ga. App. at 855, 857, 743 S.E.2d at 522-23.
Id. at 861, 743 S.E.2d at 525-26.
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Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for guidance." The court
noted that FIRREA provides an administrative process to handle claims
filed against failed banks where the FDIC has been appointed as
receiver.
Further, Congress provided limits on judicial review with
respect to such claims."
Although FIRREA does not explicitly mandate exhaustion of administrative remedies, the court agreed with the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning
that FIRREA's limitation on judicial review imposes such a requirement. 6 The court further agreed that such limitation covers all of the
following claims and actions: (1) "claims for payment from assets of any
depository institution for which the [FDIC] has been appointed
[rleceiver;" (2) "actions for payment from assets of such depository
institutions;" (3) "actions seeking a determination of rights with respect
to the assets of such depository institutions;" and (4) "claim[s] relating
to any act or omission of such institution or the [FDIC] as receiver.""
Lastly, the court agreed that the administrative-exhaustion requirement
should apply whether the above claims "are asserted as initial claims or
as counterclaims."18
In applying the doctrine, the court determined that all of the
customer's counterclaims were "post-receivership claims" and subject to
the administrative-exhaustion requirement." Subject matter jurisdiction is determined at the time of the initial filing of a suit, which in the
case of post-receivership claims occurs before the FDIC is appointed
receiver.20 Nevertheless, the court explained that "subject matter
jurisdiction of state courts can be preempted by federal law under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 21
Also of note in Bobick, the court affirmed the lower court's dismissal
of the customer's counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty.2 2 The
counterclaim alleged that the plaintiffs stock in the bank's holding
13. Id. at 861-63, 743 S.E.2d at 526-27.
14. Id. at 861, 743 S.E.2d at 526 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)-(13)).
15. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(dX13)(D)).
16. Id. at 862-63, 743 S.E.2d at 526-27.
17. Id. at 862, 743 S.E.2d at 526 (alterations other than for capitalization in original)
(quoting Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City Say., F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 393 (3d Cir. 1994)
(interpreting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13XD))).
18. Id. at 862-63, 743 S.E.2d at 526-27 (quoting Am. First Fed., Inc. v. Lake Forest
Park, Inc., 198 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 1999)).
19. Id. at 865, 743 S.E.2d at 528. The counterclaims each related to alleged conduct
of the bank before its failure, and the claims were not filed until after the FDIC was
appointed as receiver. Id.
20. Id. at 866, 743 S.E.2d at 529.
21. Id.; see also U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl.2.
22. Bobick, 321 Ga. App. at 868-69, 743 S.E.2d at 530-31.
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company had become worthless due to mismanagment of the bank by the
bank's officers.2 3 Pursuant to FIRREA, once the FDIC is appointed as
receiver, "it succeeds to 'all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the
insured depository institution[] and of any stockholder.'"" The court
again looked to the Eleventh Circuit and adopted its reasoning:
[Wihen a claim alleges that a failed bank's officers breached their
fiduciary duty by mismanaging the bank, resulting in the devaluation
of the shares of the bank's holding company, the harm caused to the
holding company 'is inseparable from the harm done to the [bl ank,' and
the claim is a derivative one that belongs to the FDIC as receiver for
the bank.'
As such, only the FDIC as receiver has standing to bring such a
claim.26
Based on the holding in Bobick, it is now clear that the exhaustion of
administrative remedies is required for post-receivership claims.
C.

Voluntary Cessation Does Not Render an Issue Moot
In WMW, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co.," as a matter of first
impression, the Georgia Supreme Court considered the issue of mootness
in the context of a party's voluntary termination of the challenged
conduct.29 It has been long settled in the federal courts that a party's
"voluntary cessation of challenged conduct does not ordinarily render a
case moot"o unless "subsequent events ma[ke] it absolutely clear that
the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to
recur."' This is "because a dismissal for mootness would permit a
resumption of the challenged conduct as soon as the case is dis-

23. Id. at 869, 743 S.E.2d at 531.
24. Id. at 868, 743 S.E.2d at 530 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2XA)(i)).
25. Id. at 869, 743 S.E.2d at 531 (second alteration in original) (quoting Lubin v. Skow,
382 F. App'x 866, 872 (11th Cir. 2010)).
26. Id. at 868-69, 743 S.E.2d at 530-31.
27. Id. at 864, 743 S.E.2d at 528. There is a split in the circuits regarding the
administrative-exhaustion requirements for pre-receivership claims. Id. at 865, 743 S.E.2d
at 528. Not being at issue in this case, the court declined to determine which line of
reasoning would apply to such claims, leaving this issue open for another day. Id.
28. 291 Ga. 683, 733 S.E.2d 269 (2012).
29. Id. at 685, 733 S.E.2d at 273.
30. Id. (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287
(2012)).
31. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp.
Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)). The party asserting mootness carries the burden of proof.
Id.
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missed."3 2 Agreeing with this reasoning, the court adopted this
approach."3
III. NOTEWORTHY CASES
Defining the Relevant Market Area for Corporate Car Dealers
Another noteworthy aspect of WMW, Inc. is that in determining the
"relevant market area" under the Georgia Motor Vehicle Franchise
Practices Act (the MVFPA),34 the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the court of appeals but applied different reasoning.35 In
WMW, Inc., American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Honda) intended to
establish a new dealership within eight miles of the service-only location
operated by WMW, Inc. (WMW), and WMW sued. The Superior Court
of Fulton County held that WMW lacked standing under the MVFPA to
sue Honda. The court of appeals affirmed in a five-two decision, with
the majority holding that the "dealership" location for determining the
relevant market area under MVFPA was based on its principal place of
business." The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari.3
The court determined that under the statute there are two types of
corporate dealers-"car-selling dealers" and "exclusive ll-repair []
dealers"-that are defined based on the dealers' respective activities.
As such, the court held that the relevant market area for which a dealer
has standing under the MVFPA to restrict competition is the eight-mile
radius around the location or locations where the dealer "performs the
only activity that qualifies it as a 'dealer' and 'dealership' under the
[MVFPAI," either (1) selling vehicles or (2) exclusively engaging in the
repair of vehicles." Georgia courts will look to this new reasoning in
the future.

A.

32. Id. (quoting Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2287).
33. Id.
34. O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-620 to -670 (2009 & Supp. 2013).
35. WMW, Inc., 291 Ga. at 693-94, 733 S.E.2d at 278. Last year's article discussed the
holding and analysis of the appellate court for this case. See Bates & Peterson, supra note
1, at 66-67.
36. WMW, Inc., 291 Ga. at 683-84, 733 S.E.2d at 272.
37. Id. at 684, 733 S.E.2d at 272.
38. Id. at 687-88, 733 S.E.2d at 274-75.
39. Id. at 688, 695, 733 S.E.2d at 275, 279.
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DeterminingInterests in a Dissolved Limited Partnership
In Trauner v. Thadikamalla (In re Thadikamalla),o the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia looked to
settled Georgia partnership law to determine the rights and interests of
the parties with respect to a limited partnership." In 2000, a husband
formed a lawful limited partnership with his wife and two children to
hold real-estate properties, but the partners did not execute a written
partnership agreement. Nonetheless, the husband "acted as the de facto
general partner" until his death in 2002. After his death, the remaining
partners took no affirmative action either to continue or terminate the
partnership.4 2
At the time of his death, the husband owned 60% of the partnership,
the wife owned 10%, and their children owned 10% and 20%. The 2008
tax return for the partnership listed the wife as owning 70% and the
children as owning 10% and 20%. The following year, the partnership
tax return listed the wife as owning 10% and the children as owning
40% and 50%. That same year, the wife filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.43
Because no partnership agreements were ever entered into by the
partners, the court looked to Georgia's Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act (the Partnership Act)" to govern the analysis.45 In
accordance with the Partnership Act, where a general partner is an
individual, his or her death is deemed a withdrawal from the partnership.46 The withdrawal of a general partner, without an agreement to
the contrary, triggers the dissolution of the partnership and necessitates
that the partnership's affairs be wound up.4 '
The court confirmed that despite its dissolution, a partnership will
continue to exist until its certificate has been cancelled." Accordingly,
the court held that because the partners failed to wind up the partnership, the husband passed his 60% partnership interest to his wife
through his will.49 As such, the wife owned a 70% interest in the

B.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

481 B.R. 232 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012).
Id. at 237.
Id. at 234-35 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 234-36.
O.C.G.A. ch. 14-9 (2003 & Supp. 2012).
In re Thadikamalla, 481 B.R. at 237-38.
O.C.G.A. § 14-9-602(a)(6XA).
O.C.G.A. § 14-9-801(3).
In re Thadikamalla, 481 B.R. at 238 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 14-9-203, -206(c)).
Id.
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partnership at the time she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.o That
interest, along with her rights in the partnership, was thereby assigned
to the bankruptcy trustee.5 1
The bankruptcy trustee attempted to make several claims with respect
to the property held by the partnership.5 2 Nevertheless, the court held
that the interest received by the bankruptcy trustee was limited to the
wife's rights and interest in the partnership itself, not the assets held by
the partnership.53 This case serves as a healthy reminder that
dissolution does not automatically terminate a partnership.
C.

Applying the PerformanceException to the Statute of Frauds
Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Mid-South Capital, Inc.54 serves as
a good reminder that "a party's conduct may bind him to the terms of a
contract, even if he does not sign the agreement."" In this case,
Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. (Hemispherx) was looking to raise
additional capital. Its chief executive officer (CEO) met with Mid-South
Capital, Inc. (Mid-South), which had raised capital for Hemispherx in
the past. They discussed strategies for raising the capital, and MidSouth asked for information about Hemispherx and its assets to use to
pitch to prospective investors. Before providing this information, the
CEO requested that Mid-South send Hemispherx a copy of its engagement letter. Thereafter, Mid-South sent Hemispherx a copy of its
standard engagement letter, which contained a discounted brokerage fee
as they had discussed."
The engagement letter provided, among other things, that Mid-South
would receive from Hemispherx cash equal to 5% of the capital raised
from each investor identified or introduced to Hemispherx by Mid-South.
Although the agreement could be terminated, it provided that Hemispherx would remain obligated to pay Mid-South's commission on any
transactions involving any such investors for at least two years
thereafter."
The engagement letter was never signed on Hemispherx's behalf.
Without communicating any rejection of the terms, the CEO authorized
50. Id. The court noted that reliance on the tax records to establish the proper
ownership interests was misplaced. Id.
51. Id. at 239. This included the right to wind up the partnership. Id.
52. Id. at 239-41.
53. Id. at 240. Turnover of any partnership property was premature without first
winding up the partnership. Id.
54. 690 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2012).
55. Id. at 1225.
56. Id. at 1221.
57. Id.
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Mid-South to start seeking investors for Hemispherx and sent Mid-South
the information on the company and its assets that Mid-South had
requested. For many months thereafter, Mid-South contacted potential
investors, put together proposed deals, and submitted multiple investment proposals to Hemispherx. In the meantime, Hemispherx hired
other investment brokers for the same purpose. The last investment
broker that Hemispherx hired closed several deals, three of which were
with prospective investors that Mid-South had introduced to Hemispherx.5
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
found that because the agreement was never signed, Mid-South's breach
of contract claim failed as a matter of law due to the statute of
frauds. 9 In reversing the lower court's decision, the Eleventh Circuit
applied the exception to the statute of frauds where one party performs
pursuant to an unsigned contract, and the other party accepts such
performance.o The court explained that the CEO of Hemispherx only
authorized Mid-South to start soliciting investors after receiving the
requested engagement letter.61 Mid-South thereafter actively pursued
investors on Hemispherx's behalf.62 Such facts were sufficient to state
a plausible claim.63
Also, based on the facts presented, the court reversed summary
judgment for Mid-South's equitable claims of promissory estoppel,
quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment, holding that there remained
disputed issues of material fact for a jury to resolve."
This case demonstrates the importance of negotiating the terms of an
agreement and voicing any disagreement with such terms prior to the
parties' performance thereof
D. Reaffirming Reasonable Restraints on Trade
Carson v. Obor Holding Co., LLC illustrates Georgia's method of
analyzing the enforceability of forum-selection clauses in restrictive
covenants.6 6 In Carson, Alan Carson, a member of Obor Holding

58. Id. at 1222-24. Mid-South submitted proposals to Hemispherx for the same
investors less than a month before the third investment broker closed the deals. Id. at
1223-24.
59. Id. at 1224.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1225.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1224.
65. 318 Ga. App. 645, 734 S.E.2d 477 (2012).
66. Id. at 648, 734 S.E.2d at 481.
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Company, LLC (Obor Holding) and former employee of Obor Digital,
LLC (Obor Digital), Obor Holding's subsidiary, sought to enjoin Obor
Holding from enforcing certain restrictive covenants against him.17
Obor Holding was a Florida limited liability company, and its
operating agreement, to which Carson was a party, designated Florida
as the governing law. Obor Holding's subsidiary conducted business in
Florida and Georgia. Importantly, Carson was a Georgia resident. He
was vice president of sales for Obor Digital until he was "constructively
discharged" due to a pay reduction. He initiated this suit not long
after. 8
The Georgia Court of Appeals first considered whether the forumselection clause in the operating agreement was enforceable against
Carson." This being a procedural question, the court looked to Georgia
law to make this determination rather than the governing law identified
in the operating agreement.o
Consistent with past holdings, the court applied the principle that
where "a party can show both that a restrictive covenant violates
Georgia public policy and that a court in the selected forum likely would
[hold] the restrictive covenant enforceable, a compelling reason exists to
avoid the contractual forum[-] selection clause."" Because the restrictive covenant was part of an operating agreement signed in 2006, the
court applied Georgia's common law governing restrictive covenants."

67. Id. at 645-46, 734 S.E.2d at 479.
68. Id. at 646-47, 734 S.E.2d at 480-81. In his position, Carson was responsible for
sales, training, and staffing services. Id. at 647, 734 S.E.2d at 480.
69. Id. at 647, 734 S.E.2d at 480.
70. Id. at 647-48, 734 S.E.2d at 480-81.
71. Id. at 648, 734 S.E.2d at 481.
72. Id. at 646 n.1, 734 S.E.2d at 479 n.1. The date that the operating agreement was
signed is important due to the recent enactment of O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-50 to -59 (2010 &
Supp. 2013), which provides a comprehensive statutory framework for analyzing restrictive
covenants in Georgia. See O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-50 to -59. However, it should be noted that
these statutes are not applied retroactively. Carson, 318 Ga. App. at 646 n.1, 734 S.E.2d
at 474 n.1; see also Ga. H.R. Bill 173, § 4, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 231 (codified at
O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-50 to -59 (2010)); Ga. H.R. Bill 30, § 5, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 399
(codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-50 to -59 (Supp. 2013)). The Georgia General Assembly stated
that this framework should go into effect on November 3, 2010. See Ga. H.R. Bill 173, § 4
(enacting the new law "effective on the day following the ratification ... of an amendment
to the Constitution of Georgia," which would provide the looser constitutional framework
required for the new statute); see also GA. CONST. art. 3, § 6 1 5. However, the constitutional amendment was arguably ineffective until January 1, 2011. Compare Becham v.
Synthes USA, 482 F. App'x 387, 389 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that the amendment was not
effective until January 1, 2011) with Cox v. Altus Healthcare & Hospice, Inc., 706 Ga. App.
28, 30, 706 S.E.2d 660, 663-64 (2011) (assuming without close analysis that the new
statutory framework would be applied after November 3, 2010). Thus, the new law became
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A restrictive covenant governed by Georgia's common law is unenforceable unless it is a "'reasonable' restraint on competition" in light of the
facts underlying it." Under the common law, "reasonableness" is a
question of law for a court to decide based on a three-prong test
evaluating the covenant's (1) duration, (2) geographic coverage, and (3)
scope of prohibited activity."
Considering the facts at hand, the court held that, even under the
common law's mid-level scrutiny, the restrictive covenants failed all
elements of the test." The court analyzed each of the restrictive
effective November 3, 2010, the day after the constitutional amendment was ratified, but
the constitutional framework was arguably not effective until January 1, 2011, leaving a
gap between November 3, 2010 and January 1, 2011, where the law was effective but the
supporting constitutional framework was not (this gap period hereinafter called the "Gap").
Patrick L. Coyle, Alexandra Garrison Barnett & Brooks A. Suttle, Laborand Employment,
Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 64 MERCER L. REV. 965, 986 (2013). In an unpublished opinion,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the law should not be applied to a contract signed during
the Gap. See Becham, 482 F. App'x at 392 (stating that the contract was entered into on
December 1, 2010 and holding that the Georgia common law applied). The Eleventh Circuit
further stated that the law was void from the moment that it went into effect and stated
that the General Assembly's reenactment of the law did not revive the first statute. Id.
Thus, under the court's analysis in Becham, any contract signed before May 11, 2011, the
effective date of the General Assembly's reenactment of the law, see Ga. H.R. Bill 30, Reg.
Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 399, is subject to Georgia's common law governing restrictive
covenants. See Becham, 482 F. App'x at 392. A discussion of this new law and its
application to the forum selection doctrines discussed herein is beyond the scope of this
Article. However, it is important to note that the new law marks a substantive change in
the law of restrictive covenants. See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(d) (stating that any restrictive
covenant not in compliance with the article is void and unenforceable). This new framework
will be applied when performing the state-to-state comparison of enforceability as to a
forum-selection clause in a restrictive covenant entered into after the new law's legitimate
effective date, while the common law will govern all contracts entered into prior to the
effective date. See Carson, 318 Ga. App. at 646 n.1, 648, 734 S.E.2d at 479 n.1, 481.
73. Carson, 318 Ga. App. at 648, 734 S.E.2d at 481.
74. Id. In addition to these factors, courts have also considered "the nature and extent
of the trade or business, the situation of the parties, and all the other circumstances." Id.
(quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Mouyal, 262 Ga. 464,465,422 S.E.2d 529, 531(1992)). While
the general three-part time, area, and activity test is still present in the new law, see
O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a), these terms have a redefined meaning under the statutory safe
harbors, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(c) (providing a safe harbor for geographic-area and
competitive-activity restrictions for employee noncompetition agreements), -56 (providing
presumptions of validity as to certain geographic-area and competitive-activity restrictions),
-57 (providing rebuttable presumptions as to the duration of various types of noncompetition agreements).
75. Carson, 318 Ga. App. at 649, 734 S.E.2d at 481. Under the common law, strict
scrutiny is applied with respect to employer-employee relationships, whereas mid-level
scrutiny is applied where restrictive covenants are contained in partnership or shareholder
agreements. Id. at 648-49, 734 S.E.2d at 481. The detailed nature of the new statutory
restrictions and limitations, which distinguish regular employees, salespersons, owners,
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covenants in turn." First, the non-disclosure provision was "overly
broad" and unenforceable under the common law because it was to last
"in perpetuity" and failed to define "confidential information."" Next,
the non-solicitation clause was unenforceable under the common law
because it prohibited Carson from contacting Obor Holding's clients and
prospects irrespective of whether he actually had business relationships
with them, and the clause also failed to include a territorial restriction." The clause also prohibited Carson from accepting work from any
client or prospect who later initiated contact with him.79 The court
explained that "[s] uch a restraint violate [d] Georgia public policy because
it 'unreasonably impact led]' the restricted party's ability to make a living
and the public's ability to choose the business or professional it prefers
to contract with."80 Lastly, the non-competition clause was held "prima
facie unreasonable" under the common law because it applied to the
entire United States rather than being limited to the territory where
Carson worked or the territory where Obor Holdings did business."
The non-competition clause was also determined to be "overbroad"
because it prohibited Carson from "working in any capacity for, owning
any interest in, or serving on the board of any competitor of Obor Holding.'s
Thus, the court determined that the restrictive covenants were
unenforceable under the common law and, after determining that a
Florida court would likely determine the covenants enforceable under
Florida law, held that the forum-selection clause was unenforceable.
This case shows the importance of carefully limiting restrictive
covenants no matter what governing law is selected.

key personnel, and professionals, see, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-51(5), (6), (7), (14), (16), (17), 52(a), -53(a), -57, seems to abrogate the use of the old middle-strict scrutiny tests,
especially in light of the constitutional amendment designed to allow for this broad
statutory framework, see GA. CONST. art. 3, § 6, 1 5; however, only time will tell.
76. Carson, 318 Ga. App. at 649-53, 734 S.E.2d at 481-84.
77. Id. at 649, 734 S.E.2d at 482.
78. Id. at 650, 734 S.E.2d at 482. Under the common law, the restraint must either be
limited to those clients that the person actually serves or include a territorial restriction.
Id. Under the new statute, non-solicitation agreements are governed by O.C.G.A. § 13-853(b).
79. Carson, 318 Ga. App. at 651, 734 S.E.2d at 482-83.
80. Id. at 651, 734 S.E.2d at 483 (quoting Dougherty, McKinnon & Luby, P.C. v.
Greenwald, Denzik & Davis, P.C., 213 Ga. App. 891, 894, 447 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1994)).
81. Id. at 652, 734 S.E.2d at 483. See O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-53(c) and -56 for the new law
related to this requirement. O.C.G.A. §§ 12-8-53(c), -56(2), (3).
82. Carson, 318 Ga. App. 652, 734 S.E.2d at 483-84. See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(c) for the
new law as to activity limitations. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(c).
83. Carson, 318 Ga. App. at 653-54, 734 S.E.2d at 484-85.
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LEGISIATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Amendment to Business Court Rules
Although the transfer fee for the Fulton County Superior Court
Business Case Division (Business Court) is currently $1000, in anticipation of future funding needs, the Georgia Supreme Court approved an
amendment to Atlanta Judicial Circuit Rule 10048 increasing the
maximum transfer-fee amount from $1000 to $2500."

A.

B. Anniversary of the GeorgiaLimited Liability Act
It is worth noting that the Georgia Limited Liability Act" turned
twenty years old this year.87

84. Minutes, Supreme Court of Georgia (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.fultoncourt.org/bus
iness/BusinessCourtRulesAmendedOctober2Ol2.pdf.
85. 2012 Annual Report, Fulton County Superior Court: Business Court, http://www.
fultoncourt.org/business/BusinessCourt_2012_Annual_Report.pdf.
86. Ga. H.R. Bill 264, Reg. Sess., 1993 Ga. Laws 123 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.
ch. 14-11 (2003 & Supp. 2013)).
87. Id.

